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Abstract
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong
restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties
of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to design efficient algorithms
using elementary techniques. We focus on the setting in which all agents involved in some
matching problem can be partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent
determines his or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be
refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation would arise in
practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small collection of agents’ at-
tributes. We also consider a generalisation in which each agent may consider some small
collection of other agents to be exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consis-
tent with their types; this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small
number of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), several well-studied
NP-hard stable matching problems including MAX SMTI (that of finding the maximum
cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists)
belong to the parameterised complexity class FPT when parameterised by the number of
different types of agents needed to describe the instance. For MAX SMTI this tractability
result can be extended to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one “excep-
tional” candidate to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined),
but the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more exceptions
and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the preference lists, even if the
number of types is bounded by a constant.
1 Introduction
Matching problems occur in various applications and scenarios such as the assignment of chil-
dren to schools, college students to dorm rooms, junior doctors to hospitals, and so on. In all
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the aforementioned, and similar, problems, it is understood that the participants (which we will
refer to as agents) have preferences over other agents, or subsets of agents. The majority of
the literature assumes that these preferences are ordinal, and that is the assumption we make in
this work as well. Moreover, it is widely accepted that a “good” and “reasonable” solution to
a matching problem must be stable, where stability is defined according to the context of the
problem at hand. Intuitively speaking, a stable solution guarantees that no subset of agents find
it in their best interest to leave the prescribed solution and seek an assignment amongst them-
selves. Unfortunately, many interesting and important stable matching problems are known to
be NP-hard even for highly restricted cases.
Most hardness results in the study of stable matching problems are based on the premise
that agents may have arbitrary preference lists. In practice, however, agents’ preferences are
likely to be more structured and correlated. In this work, we consider a setting where agents
can be grouped into k different “types”, where the type of an agent determines (most of) the
agent’s preferences, and also how s/he is compared against other agents. If we allow each agent
to have a different type, this setup does not place any restrictions on the instance. However, we
are interested in the setting where the number of types required to describe an instance is much
smaller than the total number of agents: such a situation would arise in practice if agents de-
rive their preferences by considering some small collection of attributes of other agents (where
each of these attributes has a small number of possible values). As an example, consider the
hospitals-residents job market in which junior doctors or residents are to be assigned to hospital
posts. It is highly plausible that agents in this market base their preferences on a small collec-
tion of candidates’ attributes. E.g. hospitals might rank applicants based on their exam grade,
interview score, etc, and junior doctors might rank the hospitals based on the programs they of-
fer, their reputation, their geographic location, etc. Similar observations have been made in the
literature (see [3, 8]) regarding stable marriage market and stable roommates market respec-
tively, where agents form preferences based on candidates’ attributes such as attractiveness,
intelligence, wealth, etc. In this setting, we obtain our set of types by first partitioning agents
by their profile of attributes, then further partitioning each set by the preference list over other
profiles of attributes. Note that the number of possible preference lists depends only on the
number of possible attribute profiles.
The notion of types is also useful if we are interested in a relaxation of stability, where
agents are only willing to form a private arrangement with a partner who is distinctly superior
to their current partner with respect to an important characteristic. It is reasonable to assume
that in practice a certain amount of effort is required by both agents in a blocking pair to make
a private arrangement outside the matching, and so agents are unlikely to make this effort for
a very small improvement in their utility. Suppose that an agent is only willing to make the
effort to form a private arrangement if it results in a significantly better partner, specifically
one which has a significantly better value for the most important attribute. In this case we only
need to consider attributes which are the most important for at least one agent, and moreover
we might reasonably consider only a small number of categories of values for these attributes.
The simplest model (discussed in Section 3 is to assume that the agents of the same type
are completely indistinguishable. That is, they have the same preference lists, and every other
agent that finds their type acceptable is indifferent between them. Equivalently, we can say that
each type has a preference ordering over types of the candidates, which need not be complete
or strict. We also consider two generalisations of this basic model. In the first generalisa-
tion (discussed in Section 4), agents no longer have to be indifferent between agents of the
same type: they can refine their preference lists arbitrarily (so that agents of the same type
still occur consecutively), so long as the preference lists for agents of the same type are iden-
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tical. In the second generalisation (discussed in Section 5, we instead enrich the basic model
by allowing each agent to consider some small number of other agents “exceptional”: such
agents can appear anywhere in the preference list, regardless of their type. This situation with
exceptions might arise in practice if, for example, an agent knows some of the candidates di-
rectly or through a third-party connection and, based on this additional information, ranks them
disregarding their type, e.g. at the top or bottom of his/her preference list.
We show that we can solve some of the most important hard stable matching problems
efficiently from the point of view of parameterised complexity when the number of types is
taken as the parameter. We obtain our results by reducing a given hard stable matching problem
to the problem of solving a number of instances of a tractable problem, where this number is a
function of the number of types. Some of our results rely on the fixed parameter tractability of
Integer Linear Programming (ILP). We also demonstrate that, by imposing further restrictions,
some of these hard stable matching problems become polynomial-time solvable.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the main concepts we use in the paper; we begin with some defini-
tions, then provide a brief introduction to parameterised complexity, before describing existing
results on Integer Programming.
2.1 Definitions
In this section we provide the key definitions for the stable matching settings we study; for
further background and terminology we refer the reader to [29].
Perhaps the most widely studied matching problem is the Stable Marriage problem (SM).
In an instance of SM we have two disjoint sets of agents, men and women, each having a strict
preference ordering over the individuals of the opposite sex (candidates). Stable Marriage with
Incomplete lists (SMI), Stable Marriage with Ties (SMT) and Stable Marriage with Ties and
Incomplete lists (SMTI) are generalisations of SM where agents are permitted to declare some
candidates unacceptable, are allowed to express indifference between two or more candidates,
or both, respectively. The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is a non-bipartite generalization
of SM. Extensions allowing for incomplete lists and indifference in preference lists are defined
the same way as for SM. Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) is a famous extension of SMI that
models many practical applications, including the assignment of junior doctors to hospitals, by
allowing agents on one side of the market to be assigned to multiple agents on the other side of
the market. Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) is an extension of HR that allows
for indifference in preference lists (note that in the standard terminology, both HR and HRT
allow for incomplete lists, see [29]).
Let N denote a set of n agents, which in a bipartite matching setting (i.e. SMTI or HRT)
is composed of two disjoint sets. Each hospital h in an instance of HRT is associated with a
capacity q(h) that denotes the number of posts it offers. When in a bipartite matching setting,
we use the term candidates to refer to the agents on the opposite side of the market to that of
an agent under consideration. In non-bipartite settings, candidates refer to all the other agents
except the one under consideration.
Each agent finds a subset of candidates acceptable and ranks them in order of preference.
Preference orderings need not to be strict, so it is possible for an agent to be indifferent between
two or more candidates. We write b a c, or equivalently c ≺a b, to denote that agent a prefers
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candidate b to candidate c, and b 'a c to denote that a is indifferent between b and c. We write
b a c to denote that a either prefers b to c or is indifferent between them, and say that a weakly
prefers b to c.
In an instance of SMTI, a matching M is a pairing of men and women such that no one
is paired with an unacceptable partner, each man is paired with at most one woman, and each
woman is paired with at most one man. In an SRTI instance, a matching is a pairing of agents
such that each agent is matched with at most one other agent whom s/he additionally finds
acceptable. We write (a, b) ∈ M to say that a and b are matched in M . In an instance of
HRT, a matching is a pairing of hospitals and residents such that no agent is paired with an
unacceptable candidate, each resident is matched with at most one hospital, and each hospital
h is matched with at most q(h) residents. We use M(a) to denote the agent (or the set of agents
in the case of hospitals) matched to a in M . We write M(a) = ∅ if agent a is unmatched in
M . We assume that every agent prefers being matched to an acceptable candidate to remaining
unmatched.
Given an instance of SMTI or SRTI, a matching M is (weakly) stable if there is no pair
(a, b) /∈ M where a prefers b to his current partner in M , i.e., b a M(a), and vice versa.
Given an instance of HRT, a matching M is stable if there is no acceptable (resident,hospital)
pair (r, h) such that (i) r prefers h to M(r), and (ii) either |M(h)| < q(h) or h prefers r to its
worst assigned resident in M .
In their seminal work, Gale and Shapley [17] showed that every instance of SMI admits
a stable matching that can be found in polynomial time by their proposed algorithm (GS). A
simple extension of GS can be used to identify stable matchings in instances of SMTI and
mechanisms very similar to GS have been used to compute a stable assignment of residents
to hospitals in instances of HRT. An instance of SR need not admit a stable matching [17].
Irving [22] provided a polynomial time algorithm that finds a stable matching in an instance
of SR, or reports that none exists. Gusfield and Irving [20] showed that it is straightforward to
generalise this algorithm to instances of SRI.
2.2 Hard Stable Matching Problems
As explained above, the problem of identifying a stable matching, or showing that none exits,
can be solved efficiently for instances of SMTI, HRT and SRI. In contrast to the case for stable
marriage, allowing indifference in the stable roommates problem makes the quest for a stable
matching a difficult task. Ronn [37] showed that WEAK SRT, the problem of deciding whether
a stable matching exists, given an instance of SRT, is NP-complete.
The importance of stable solutions has been argued and stressed by economists (see e.g.[38,
39, 41]) and finding a stable matching is at the core of many practical applications such as the
assignment of residents to hospitals in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in
the United States. In many practical applications, however, it is also important to match as
many agents as possible, and thus finding a maximum cardinality stable matching (i.e., a stable
matching with the largest size amongst all stable matchings) is a crucial issue.
It is known that (in contrast with SMI) an instance of SMTI might admit stable matchings
of different sizes, and GS does not necessarily find the largest. MAX SMTI, the problem of
determining the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of SMTI, is known to be
NP-hard [6, 23, 30, 35], even when the input is heavily restricted.
The concern of computing a maximum size stable matching extends to instances of HRT.
As SMTI can be seen as a special case of HRT in which every hospital has capacity exactly
one, the NP-hardness of MAX SMTI implies that MAX HRT, the problem of determining the
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maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of HRT, is also NP-hard. Conversely, we
can express any instance of MAX HRT as an instance of MAX SMTI using a standard cloning
argument [29, 40]: for each hospital h in the HRT instance, we create q(h) identical agents in
the SMTI instance, each with capacity one.
NP-hardness of WEAK SRT implies that MAX SRT, the problem of identifying a max-
imum cardinality stable matching in an instance of SRT or reporting that none exists, is also
NP-hard. Note that this problem is hard even when all agents find all other agents acceptable.
Depending on the application, one might be willing to tolerate a small degree of instability
if that leads to larger matchings. Two different measurements for the degree of instability have
been introduced in the literature: the number of blocking pairs and the number of blocking
agents. MAX SIZE MIN BP SMI (respectively MAX SIZE MIN BA SMI) is the problem of
finding a matching, out of all maximum cardinality matchings, which has the minimum number
of blocking pairs (respectively minimum number of blocking agents, i.e. agents who belong to
at least one blocking pair) in an instance of SMI. Both of these problems are NP-hard and very
difficult to approximate [6]. Note that these two problems are hard even when there are no ties
in preference lists.
Since an instance of SR may not admit a stable matching, it is of interest to find a matching
with minimum number of blocking pairs. Abraham et al. [1] showed that MIN BP SR, the
problem of identifying a matching which has the minimum number of blocking pairs in an
instance of SR, is NP-hard and very hard to approximate. Note that this problem is hard even
if all agents rank all the other agents in strict order of preference.
2.3 Parameterised Complexity
In this paper we are concerned with the parameterised complexity of computational problems
that are intractable in the classical sense. Parameterised complexity provides a multivariate
framework for the analysis of hard problems: if a problem is known to be NP-hard, so that
we expect the running-time of any algorithm to depend exponentially on some aspect of the
input, we can seek to restrict this combinatorial explosion to one or more parameters of the
problem rather than the total input size. This has the potential to provide an efficient solution
to the problem if the parameter(s) in question are much smaller than the total input size. A
parameterised problem with total input size n and parameter k is considered to be tractable if
it can be solved by a so-called FPT algorithm, an algorithm whose running time is bounded
by f(k) · nO(1), where f can be any computable function. Such problems are said to be fixed
parameter tractable, and belong to the complexity class FPT. It should be emphasised that, for
a problem to be in FPT, the exponent of the polynomial must be independent of the parameter
value; problems which satisfy the weaker condition that the running time is polynomial for any
constant value of the parameter(s) (so that the degree of the polynomial may depend on the
parameters) are said to belong to the class XP.
For further background on the theory of parameterised complexity, we refer the reader to
[12, 15].
2.4 The complexity of Integer Programming
Many of the algorithms we present in this paper make use of an algorithm for INTEGER LINEAR
PROGRAMMING in some way. This problem is formally stated as follows: given an m ×
k matrix A and two m-dimensional vectors b and c (all with coefficients in Z), find a m-
dimensional vector x ∈ Z which minimizes the scalar product cT · x, subject to the m linear
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constraints given byAx ≤ b, or else report that no vector satisfying the constraints exists. Note
that we can easily translate problems in which we wish to maximise rather than minimise the
objective function into this form, and also we can express constraints based on linear equalities
as a combination of linear inequalities; for simplicity of presentation we will use both of these
generalisations when expressing problems as instances of INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING.
While INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING isNP-hard in general, one of the most celebrated
results in parameterised complexity is that this problem belongs to FPT when parameterised
by the number of variables.
Theorem 1 ([11], based on [16, 24, 27]). An INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING instance of
size L with k variables can be solved using
O(k2.5k+o(k) · (L+ logMx) log(MxMc))
arithmetic operations and space polynomial in L + logMx, where Mx is an upper bound on
the absolute value a variable can take in a solution, and Mc is the largest absolute value of a
coefficient in the vector c.
In Section 3.4 we also need to solve instances of INTEGER QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING,
a variant of INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING in which the objective function is quadratic.
Formally, given a k × k integer matrix Q, an m × k integer matrix A and an m-dimensional
integer vector b, our goal is to find a vector x ∈ Zk which minimises xTQx, subject to the
m linear constraints Ax ≤ b, or else report that no vector satisfying the constraints exists. As
before, we note that we can easily generalise this definition to deal with maximisation problems
and constraints in the form of linear equalities. Lokshtanov recently gave an FPT algorithm for
this problem.
Theorem 2 ([28]). INTEGER QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING is in FPT parameterised by k+α,
where α is the maximum absolute value of any entry in the matrices A and Q.
2.5 Related Work
NP-hard matching problems. The NP-hardness of MAX SMTI has been shown for a vari-
ety of restricted for example: (1) even if each man’s list is strictly ordered, and each woman’s
list is either strictly ordered or is a tie of length 2 [30], (2) even if each mans preference list
is derived from a strictly-ordered master list of women, and each woman’s preference list is
derived from a master list of men that contains only one tie [23], and (3) even if the SMTI
instance has symmetric preferences; that is, for any acceptable (man, woman) pair (mi, wj),
rank(mi, wj) = rank(wj,mi) [35], where rank(a, b) is defined to be one plus the number of
candidates that a prefers to b. As SMTI is a special case of HRT, the NP-hardness of finding a
maximum stable matching in the latter follows directly from the NP-hardness of this problem
in the former.
The NP-completeness of WEAK SRT, and hence MAX SRT, holds even if each preference
list is either strictly ordered or contains a tie of length 2 at the head.
MAX SIZE MIN BP SMI and MAX SIZE MIN BA SMTI areNP-hard and very hard to ap-
proximate [5] even if each agent’s preference list is of length at most 3 [6, 21], but polynomial-
time solvable if agents on one side of the market have preference lists of length at most 2 [6].
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Parameterized complexity of matching problems. There are a limited number of works
addressing fixed-parameter tractability in stable matching problems. Marx and Schlotter [31]
gave the first parameterised complexity results on MAX SMTI. They show that the problem is
in FPT when parameterised by the total length of the ties, but is W[1]-hard when parameterised
by the number of ties in the instance, even if all the men have strictly ordered preference lists.
Very recently, three different works have studied hard stable matching problems from the per-
spective of parameterised complexity. In [34], the authors obtained results on the parameterised
complexity of finding a stable matching which matches a given set of distinguished agents and
has as few blocking pairs as possible. In [19] it is shown that several hard stable matching
problems, including MAX SMTI, are W[1]-hard when parameterised by the treewidth of the
graph obtained by adding an edge between each pair of agents that find each other mutually
acceptable. In [18], the authors study above guarantee parameterisations of the problem of
finding a stable matching that balances the dissatisfaction of men and women, with parameters
that capture the degree of dissatisfaction.
Attributes and types. Settings in which agents are partitioned into different types, or derive
their preferences based on a set of attributes assigned to each candidate, have been considered
for the problems of sampling and counting stable matchings in instances of SM or SR (see,
e.g., [3, 8, 9]). In [14], the authors study the problem of characterising matchings that are
rationalisable as stable matchings when agents’ preferences are unobserved. They focus on a
restricted setting that translates into assigning each agent a type based on several attributes,
and assuming that agents of the same type are identical and have identical preferences. They
remark that empirical studies on marriage typically make such an assumption [10]. Bounded
agent types have been considered in [2, 42] to derive polynomial-time results for the coalition
structure generation problem, an important issue in cooperative games when the goal is to
partition the participants into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions in order to maximise the social
welfare.
3 Our basic model: agents of the same type are indistin-
guishable
In this section we begin with a formal definition of the simplest model we consider, in which
agents’ preferences can be derived directly from the preferences of types over types of can-
didates. This implies that agents of the same type are completely indistinguishable. That is,
they have the same preference lists, and every other agent that finds their type acceptable is
indifferent between them.
We then identify a necessary and sufficient condition, in terms of the types of the least and
the second least desirable partners assigned to any agent of each type, for a matching to be stable
in this model. We use this to show that, if there are k types, we can solve MAX SRTI by solving
kO(k) instances of INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING. This implies that MAX SRTI and hence
MAX SMTI, parameterised by k, belong to FPT. We then show that we can solve MAX SMTI
more efficiently by solving kO(k) · log n instances of MAX FLOW on directed networks with
O(k) vertices and maximum edge capacity O(n). This alternative approach reduces the time
complexity of MAX SMTI from kO(k2) log3 n+O(n) to kO(k) · log2 n+O(n). The O(n) part
of the time complexities accounts for the time required to construct the maximum cardinality
matching.
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Lastly, we extend the methods for solving MAX SRTI to provide FPT algorithms for MAX
SIZE MIN BP SMTI and MAX SIZE MIN BA SMTI.
3.1 Definition of typed instances
Assume that there are k types available for agents. Let [k] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Let Ni
denote the set of agents that are of type i. Thus we have that the set of agents N =
⋃
i∈[k]Ni.
Each type i has a preference ordering over types of the candidates, which need not be complete
or strict. We assume, without loss of generality, that |Ni| > 0 for all i ∈ [k], and that each type
finds at least one other type acceptable. We write j i `, or equivalently ` ≺i j, if agents of
type i strictly prefer agents of type j to agents of type `. We write j 'i ` to denote that agents
of type i are indifferent between agents of types j and `, and j i ` if agents of type i prefer
agents of type j to those of type ` or are indifferent between the two. We assume that given
every two agents x and y of the same type:
1. x and y have identical preference lists when restricted to N \ {x, y} , and
2. all other agents are indifferent between x and y.
These requirements imply that any agent either finds all agents of a given type acceptable
(and is indifferent between them) or finds none of them acceptable. We say that an instance
of a stable matching problem satisfying these requirements is typed, and refer to the standard
problems with input of this form as TYPED MAX SMTI etc. Note that TYPED MAX SMTI,
and hence TYPED MAX SRTI, remain NP-hard when k is considered to be part of the input:
we can always create a typed instance by assigning each agent its own type.
A typed instance I of SRTI is given as input by specifying the number of types k and, for
each type i, the set Ni of agents of type i as well as the preference orderingi over types of the
candidates. Observe that, if we are only given the preference list for each agent as input, it is
straightforward to compute, in polynomial time, the coarsest partition of the agents into types
that satisfies the definition of a typed instance. Having found such a partition, the preference
lists over types can also be constructed efficiently.
Example 1. Assume we have 4 types for the agents in a stable marriage setting, and that all
men are of type 1 and types 2, 3 and 4 correspond to women. Let the preference ordering of
type 1 over types of women be as follows, where the preference list is ordered from left to right
in decreasing order of preference, and the types in round brackets are tied: (2 3) 4. Assume
that there are 7 women and w1 and w2 are of type 2, w3 and w4 are of type 3, and w5, w6 and
w7 are of type 4. Therefore, the preference lists of all men under the typed model are as follows:
(w1 w2 w3 w4) (w5 w6 w7).
3.2 An FPT algorithm for TYPED MAX SRTI
Let I be a typed instance of SRTI, and letM be a matching in I . We may assume without loss of
generality that every agent is matched, by creating sufficiently many dummy agents of type k+1
which are inserted at the end of each agent’s (possibly incomplete) preference list. We define
worstM(i) and second worstM(i) to be the types of the least desirable agent and the second
least desirable agent with which any agent of type i is matched in M , respectively, breaking
ties arbitrarily (e.g. lexicographically). Note that worstM(i) would be the dummy type if an
agent of type i is unmatched (i.e. matched to a dummy agent) in M . If there is only one agent
of type i, then second worstM(i) is undefined, in which case we let second worstM(i) = ∅.
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Note that it is possible to have second worstM(i) = worstM(i). Let type(a) denote the type of
a given agent a.
The key observation is that, in order to determine whether or not M is stable, it suffices to
examine the values of worstM(i) and second worstM(i) for each i ∈ [k].
Lemma 3. Let I be a typed instance of SRTI. Then a matching M in I is stable if and only
if (1) there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2), i 6= j, such that j i worstM(i) and i j worst(j)M ,
and (2) there is no pair (i, i), i ∈ [k], such that there are at least two agents of type i and
i i second worstM(i).
Proof. Suppose first that M is not stable. In this case, by definition, there exists some pair
of agents (a, b) such that a and b are not matched together but each prefers the other over
their current partner. First suppose that a and b are of different types and without without
loss of generality assume that a is of type i and b is of type j, i 6= j. Then we know that
j i type(M(a)) i worstM(i), and similarly i j type(M(b)) j worstM(j). Now suppose
that a and b are both of the same type i. Then we know that type i likes type type(M(a)) or type
type(M(b)) at least as well as type second worstM(i). Without loss of generality assume that
type(M(a)) i second worstM(i). Since (a, b) is a blocking pair, type(b) i type(M(a)),
and therefore i i second worstM(i).
Conversely, suppose that M is stable. Suppose for a contradiction that at least one of
the two conditions in the statement of the theorem does not hold. First suppose that the first
condition does not hold, i.e. there is a pair of types (i, j), i 6= j, such that j i worstM(i) and
i j worstM(j). Then there is some agent a of type i which is matched with an agent of type
worstM(i), so in particular a is matched with a partner less desirable than any agent of type j.
Similarly, there is some agent b of type j which is matched with an agent of type worstM(j) and
hence is matched with a partner less desirable than any agent of type i. Thus a and b both prefer
each other to their current partner, and so form a blocking pair. This contradicts the assumption
that M is stable. Now suppose that the second condition does not hold, i.e. there exists a
type i corresponding to at least two agents where i i second worstM(i). Then there are two
agents a and b of type i who are matched to an agent of type worstM(i) and an agent of type
second worstM(i), respectively. Thus a and b both prefer each other to their current partner,
and so form a blocking pair. This contradicts the assumption that M is weakly stable.
We say that a matchingM realises given functions worst : [k]→ [k+1] and second worst :
[k]→ [k + 2] if, for each i ∈ [k], the least desirable and the second least desirable partners any
agent of type i has in M are of types no worse than worst(i) and second worst(i) respectively.
We say that a pair of functions (worst, second worst) is feasible if for each type i, (1) worst(i)
is either a type acceptable to type i or the dummy type, (2) second worst(i) is either a type
acceptable to type i or the dummy type, or ∅ (only if there is only one agent of type i), and (3)
if worst(i) = second worst(i) then there exist at least two agents of type worst(i). We say that
a pair of functions (worst, second worst) is I-stable for an instance I of SRTI if it is feasible,
there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2) such that j i worst(i) and i j worst(j), and there is no pair
(i, i), i ∈ [k], such that there are at least two agents of type i and i i second worstM(i).
Given a pair of I-stable functions (worst, second worst), we writemax(worst, second worst)
for the maximum cardinality of any matching in I that realises worst and second worst. Using
Lemma 3, it is straightforward to check that, given a typed instance I of SRTI, the cardinality of
a solution to MAX SRTI can be found by taking the largest value of max(worst, second worst)
over all pairs of I-stable functions (worst, second worst).
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Corollary 4. Let I be a typed instance of SRTI. Then the cardinality of the largest stable
matching in I is equal to
max{max(worst, second worst) : (worst, second worst) is I-stable}.
We next show that, given a pair of I-stable functions (worst, second worst), there is an
FPT algorithm (with parameter k) to compute max(worst, second worst).
Lemma 5. Let I be a typed instance of SRTI , and fix a pair of I-stable function (worst, second worst).
We can compute max(worst, second worst) in time 2O(k
2) log3 n.
Proof. Suppose that in total there are n agents. We compute max(worst, second worst) by
solving a suitable instance of an Integer Linear Programming. For each unordered pair of
distinct values {i, j} ∈ [k + 1](2), the variable n{i,j} represents the number of pairs in the
matching consisting of one agent of type i and another of type j. Recall that Ni is the set of
agents of type i. We then have the following integer linear program:
maximize
∑
1≤i,j≤k
n{i,j}
subject to
∑
j∈[k+1]
n{i,j} = |Ni|, ∀i ∈ [k]
n{i,j} ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ [k + 1]∑
jiworst(i)
n{i,j} = |Ni|, ∀i ∈ [k]
and
∑
jisecond worst(i)
n{i,j} ≥ |Ni| − 1, ∀i ∈ [k].
The first two constraints ensure that every agent is involved in exactly one pair, perhaps
with a dummy agent. The third constraint ensures that no agent of type i is assigned a partner
of type worse than worst(i), and the last constraint ensures that no more than one agent of type
i is assigned a partner of type worse than second worst(i). The objective function seeks to
maximise the total number of pairs that do not involve dummy agents.
The above integer linear program has 3k + (k + 1)2 constraints and (k + 1)2 variables.
The upper bound on the absolute value a variable can take is n. Therefore, by Theorem 1, this
maximisation problem for any pair of candidate functions (worst, second worst) can be solved
in time kO(k2) log3 n.
It then follows that TYPED MAX SRTI is in FPT parameterised by the number k of differ-
ent types in the instance.
Corollary 6. TYPED MAX SRTI can be solved in time kO(k2) log3 n + O(n). If we are only
interested in computing the size of the maximum cardinality matching, and not the matching
itself, this can be done in time kO(k
2) log3 n.
Proof. Let I be a typed instance of SRTI. We consider each possible pair of functions worst :
[k]→ [k+1] and second worst : [k]→ [k+2] in turn; there are at most (k+1)k(k+2)k such
pairs of functions. By Lemma 3, we can determine in timeO(k2)whether (worst, second worst)
is I-stable. If none of the candidate pairs of functions is I-stable, we conclude that there is no
stable matching and terminate. For each I-stable pair of functions (worst, second worst), we
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compute max(worst, second worst) in time kO(k2) log3 n, by Lemma 5. We then take the maxi-
mum value ofmax(worst, second worst) over all I-stable pairs of functions (worst, second worst)
which, by Corollary 4, is equal to the cardinality of the largest stable matching in I . Given all
values of n{i,j} and using suitable data structures, a maximum cardinality matching can easily
be constructed in time O(n).
3.3 An FPT algorithm for TYPED MAX SMTI
SMTI is a bipartite restriction of SRTI and therefore, by Corollary 6, we see that TYPED MAX
SMTI belongs to FPT when parameterised by the number of types in the instance. In this
section we show that the running time can be improved in the bipartite setting of SMTI and
HRT.
In this setting, we no longer need to consider the function second worst in order to deter-
mine stability or otherwise of the matching: it is enough to consider only the type of the least
desirable partner assigned to any agent of each type. The following characterisation of stability
in terms of the function worst can easily be deduced from the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 7. Let I be a typed instance of SMTI. Then a matching M in I is stable if and only if
there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2), i 6= j, such that j i worstM(i) and i j worst(j)M .
We also extend the terminology of the previous section to describe a function worst as I-
stable if there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2), i 6= j, such that j i worst(i) and i j worst(j).
Similarly, wee say that a matching M realises worst if the least desirable partner of any
agent of type i is no worse than worst(i), and write max(worst) for the cardinality of the
largest matching which realises worst. With this terminology, it is clear that (as in Corollary
4) the cardinality of the largest stable matching in a typed instance I of SMTI is equal to
max{max(worst) : worst is I-stable}.
These observations alone would allow us to simplify the ILP formulation by omitting the
final constraint, and would reduce the number of instances of ILP that must be solved to kk.
However, we can make further improvements by using a network flow method to compute the
value of max(worst) for each relevant function worst in polynomial time.
Lemma 8. Let I be a typed instance of SMTI , and fix an I-stable function worst. We can
compute max(worst) in time O(k3 log2 n).
Proof. The proof is structured as follows. Suppose that in total there are n1 women and n2
men, so we have that n = n1 + n2. Note that max(worst) is at most min{n1, n2}, which
in turn is at most bn/2c. Therefore, using a binary search strategy, we can determine the
maximum size of a matching realising worst by solving O(log n) instances of the decision
problem “Is max(worst) at least c?”, where c ∈ {1, . . . ,min{n1, n2}}. We will show that we
can determine whether max(worst) ≥ c by solving MAX FLOW on a directed network D with
O(k) vertices, in which the maximum capacity of any edge is O(n) (see Figure 1); we can
construct D from I in time O(k2 log n). MAX FLOW can be solved on D in time O(k3 log n),
using an algorithm due to Orlin [36], where the log n factor is required to carry out arithmetic
operations on integers of size O(n). Therefore, we conclude that we can compute max(worst)
in time O(k3 log2 n).
We now show how to construct the network D (depicted in Figure 1). Assume, without loss
of generality, that types 1, . . . , k1 are types of women and types k1+1, . . . , k are types of man.
We construct a directed network D = (V,E) with vertex set V = {s, t, v1, . . . , vk, dw, dm},
where vertex vi corresponds to type i, and dw and dm both correspond to the dummy type. The
edge set E is consist of the following directed edges with associated capacities:
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• −→svi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k1, with capacity |Ni|,
• −→sdw, with capacity n2 − c,
• −−→vivj for all pairs (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k1 and k1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that j i worst(i) and
i j worst(j), with capacity min{|Ni|, |Nj|},
• −−→vidm for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k1 such that worst(i) = k + 1, with capacity |Ni|,
• −−→dwvj for all k1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that worst(j) = k + 1, with capacity |Nj|,
• −−−→dwdm, with capacity min{n1, n2} − c,
• −→vjt for k1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ k, with capacity |Nj|,
• −→dmt, with capacity n1 − c.
v1
vi
vk1
dw
s
vk1+1
vj
vk
dm
t
|N1|
|Ni|
|Nk1|
n2-c
|Nk1+1|
|Nj|
|Nk|
n1-c
min(n1,n2) - c
min(|Ni|,|Nj|)
|Ni| |Nj|
Present iff j   i worst(i) 
and i   j worst(j)
Present iff worst(i) = k + 1 Present iff worst(j) = k + 1
Figure 1: Network D, constructed from an instance of SMTI in the proof of Lemma 8. Types
1, . . . , k1 are types of women and types k1 + 1, . . . , k are types of man. Vertices dw and dm
both correspond to the dummy type.
By construction, there are O(k) vertices in the network and the maximum capacity of any
edge is O(n). Therefore, it is clear that we can construct D from I in time O(k2 log n) where
the log n factor allows for the time required to read integers of size O(n) in the input. So it
only remains to show that we can decide whether max(worst) ≥ c by solving MAX FLOW on
D.
We claim that the maximum flow from s to t in D is equal to n1+n2− c if and only if there
is a matching of cardinality at least c which realises worst (i.e., if and only if max(worst) ≥ c).
Note that the flow clearly cannot exceed this value, summing the capacities of the outgoing
edges of s.
(⇒): Suppose first that there exists a matching M of cardinality at least c that realises
worst. We define a flow f in D of value n1 + n2 − c as follows:
• for all edges incident with s or t, we assign a flow equal to the capacity;
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• for each edge −−→vivj , we assign a flow equal to the number of pairs in M consisting of one
agent of type i and one agent of type j;
• for each edge −−→vidm, we assign a flow equal to the number of unassigned agents of type i
in M ;
• for each edge −−→dwvj , we assign a flow equal to the number of unassigned agents of type j
in M ; and
• to −−−→dwdm, we assign a flow equal to |M | − c.
We need to show that f is feasible and that value of f is n1 + n2 − c. It is easy to verify that
no edge is assigned a flow greater than its capacity, so to prove that f is feasible it suffices to
demonstrate that the flow is conserved at each vertex other than s and t. For any vertex vi with
1 ≤ i ≤ k1, the flow into vi is equal to |Ni|, and the total flow out of vi is the sum of the
numbers of agents of type i matched with agents of type j (for all j ≥ k1 + 1) plus the number
of agents of type i that are unmatched, which must be equal to |Ni|. A symmetric argument
holds for each vertex vj with k1 +1 ≤ j ≤ k. The flow into dw is n2− c, and the total flow out
of dw is equal to the total number of men that are unmatched in M , plus |M | − c: since each
pair in M contains exactly one distinct man, the number of unmatched men in M is equal to
n2− |M |, so the total flow out of dw is n2− |M |+(|M | − c) = n2− c. A symmetric argument
for dm completes our claim that we have defined a feasible flow. It remains to show that f does
indeed have value n1 + n2 − c: note that every outgoing edge from s is saturated, and the sum
of the capacities of these edges is equal to n1 + n2 − c.
(⇐): Conversely, suppose that we have a flow f in D with value n1 + n2 − c. We define
a matching Mf in I by greedily including f(−−→vivj) pairs consisting of one agent of type i and
one agent of type j, for every edge −−→vivj in D. We need to show that Mf : (1) is a matching, (2)
has cardinality at least c, and (3) realises worst. To check that Mf is a matching, we need to
verify that we have not assigned more than |Ni| agents of any type i. If i is a type of women,
then the total number of pairs involving an agent of type i is the total flow out from vi, which
cannot be more than the capacity of the single incoming edge to vi, which is equal to |Ni|.
Similarly, if i is a type of men, then the total number of pairs involving an agent of type i is
the total flow into vi, which cannot be more than the capacity of the single outgoing edge from
vi, which is equal to |Ni|. The cardinality of Mf is equal to the sum of flows on edges −−→vivj .
As the set of such edges, together with all outgoing edges of dw and all incoming edges of dm,
forms an s-t cut in D (in which all edges are directed the same way), we can conclude that the
cardinality of Mf is equal to the value of f minus the sum of flows on outgoing edges of dw
and incoming edges of dm. Note that the sum of flows on outgoing edges of dw cannot be more
than the capacity of the single incoming edge of dw, which is n2 − c, and similarly the sum of
flows on incoming edges of dm cannot be more than n1 − c. Thus we see that |Mf | is at least
n1+n2− c− (n2− c)− (n1− c) = c. It is clear by construction of D and Mf that Mf realises
worst. This completes our proof.
The next corollary then follows along the same lines as Corollary 6.
Corollary 9. Computing the size of the maximum cardinality matching in a typed instance of
SMTI can be done in time kO(k) · log2 n.
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3.4 FPT algorithms for TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BP SMTI and TYPED
MAX SIZE MIN BA SMTI
As stated in Section 1, in some settings the size of the matching takes priority over the stability
criterion. That is, the mechanism designers are willing to tolerate a small degree of instability
if that leads to a matching of larger size. We can extend the methods from previous sections to
deal with this situation in both the bipartite and non-bipartite setting; for simplicity of presen-
tation we begin with the case of SMTI and then discuss how to extend the method to SRTI.
We begin by considering the problem of minimising the total number of blocking pairs. For
the rest of this section, we assume that types 1 to k′ are types of women, and types k′ + 1 to k
are types of men. We further assume that all preference lists are extended to include the dummy
type as their least desirable acceptable type. If an agent a is unmatched inM , we say thatM(a)
is of type k + 1, the dummy type. As a first step, we translate the definition of a blocking pair
into the setting of typed instances.
Proposition 10. Let x and y be agents of type i and type j respectively, and suppose that M(x)
is of type j′ and M(y) is of type i′. Then (x, y) is a blocking pair in M if and only if j i j′
and i j i′.
Given this observation, we can obtain an expression for the total number of blocking pairs
in M that are comprised of an agent of type i and an agent of type j.
Lemma 11. The number of blocking pairs (x, y) in M such that x is a woman of type i and y
is a man of type j is given by∑
i′≺ji
n{i′,j}
(∑
j′≺ij
n{i,j′}
)
=
∑
1≤i′,j′≤k+1
n{i′,j}n{i,j′}
(
1i′≺ji1j′≺ij
)
,
where 1a≺bc is an indicator function that returns one if a ≺b c and zero otherwise.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equation are
equal. For the remainder of the proof, we focus on the left-hand side of the equation. By
Proposition 10, we know that the set of blocking pairs consisting of one agent of type i and
another of type j is precisely
{(x, y) : type(M(x)) ≺i tj and type(M(y)) ≺j ti}.
The cardinality of this set is thus equal to the number of agents of type i that are matched
to an agent of type inferior to type j (
∑
j′≺ij n{i,j′}) multiplied by the number of agents of
type j that are matched to an agent of type inferior to type i (
∑
i′≺ji n{i′,j}). The result follows
immediately.
Summing over all possibilities for i and j gives the following result.
Lemma 12. The total number of blocking pairs in M is given by∑
1≤i,j≤k
∑
1≤i′,j′≤k+1
n{i′,j}n{i,j′}
(
1i′≺ji1j′≺ij
)
.
We can now prove our main result concerning TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BP SMTI.
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Theorem 13. TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BP SMTI belongs to FPT when parameterised by the
number k of different types in the given instance.
Proof. We begin by computing, in polynomial time, the cardinalityCmax of a maximum match-
ing in our instance. Our strategy then is to formulate MAX SIZE MIN BP SMTI as an instance
of INTEGER QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING. Our goal is to minimise the following objective
function ∑
1≤i,j≤k
∑
1≤i′,j′≤k+1
n{i′,j}n{i,j′}
(
1i′≺ji1j′≺ij
)
=
∑
1≤i,i′≤k′
k′<j,j′≤k
(
1i′≺ji1j′≺ij + 1i≺j′ i′1j≺i′j′
)
+
∑
1≤i≤k′
k′≤j,j′≤k
n{k+1,j}n{i,j′}1j′≺ij
+
∑
1≤i,i′≤k′
k′≤j≤k
n{i′,j}n{i,k+1}1i′≺ji
+
∑
1≤i≤k′
k′<j≤k
n{k+1,j} + n{i,k+1},
subject to the constraints∑
j∈[k+1]
n{i,j} = |Ni| ∀i ∈ [k]
and
∑
1≤i,j≤k
n{i,j} = Cmax.
To see that the right-hand side of the objective function equation is equal to the left-hand
side of the equation, notice that every pair ({i, j}, {i′, j′}) ∈ [k](2) appears twice in the summa-
tion on the left-hand side: once with {i, j} coming from the first sum and {i′, j′} coming from
the second sum, and once the other way around. The former counts the number of blocking
pairs (x, y) where x is of type i, y is of type j, and M(x) and M(y) are of types j′ and i′
respectively. The latter counts the number of blocking pairs (x, y) where x is of type i′, y is of
type j′, M(x) is of type j, and M(y) is of type i. Pairs ({i, j}, {i′, j′}) where at least one of
i, i′, j, j′ is equal to the dummy type k+1 are dealt with separately (in this case there can be at
most one blocking pair).
The linear constraints enforce that every agent is involved in exactly one pair (perhaps with
a dummy agent), and that the number of pairs that do not involve dummy agents is equal to the
maximum possible cardinality of a matching. We can write our objective function in the form
xTQx where x is the vector (n{1,1}, n{1,2}, . . . , n{k,k})T and the entry of Q corresponding to
n{i,j′} and n{i′,j} is equal to either 0, 1 or 2 depending on how many of the following conditions
hold:
1. j i j′ and i j i′, and
2. j′ i′ j and i′ j′ i.
Thus, by Theorem 2, we have an FPT algorithm to solve our instance of MAX SIZE MIN BP
SMTI.
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We now consider the problem of minimising the number of agents which are involved in
at least one blocking pair. We start by characterising the conditions under which an agent
of a particular type can belong to one or more blocking pairs; this characterisation follows
immediately from the definition of a blocking pair.
Lemma 14. Let x be an agent of type i and assume that M(x) is of type j (which would be a
dummy type if x is unmatched). Then x belongs to a blocking pair if and only if there is some
agent y of type j′ who is paired with an agent of type i′ (which would be a dummy type if y is
unmatched) such that i j′ i′ and j′ i j.
Using this characterisation, we can now prove our main result concerning TYPED MAX
SIZE MIN BA SMTI.
Theorem 15. TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BA SMTI belongs to FPT when parameterised by the
number k of different types in the given instance.
Proof. For any matchingM , we can define a collection of at most k(k+1)/2 boolean variables
vi,j (for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k+1, where type k+1 is a dummy type), so that vi,j is true if and only if
the matching contains at least one pair involving an agent of type i and an agent of type j (and
unmatched agents are considered to be matched with agents of the dummy type k + 1). For a
given matching M , this collection of variables defines a vector vM in {0, 1}k(k+1)/2, which we
call the type-signature of the matching M .
Note that there are at most 2k(k+1)/2 = O(2k2) possible type-signatures for a matching;
we will consider each possible type-signature v in turn and determine the minimum number
of agents which can be involved in blocking pairs in a maximum matching which has type-
signature v (if a maximum matching with this type-signature exists). Minimising over this set
of optimal solutions will give the desired answer.
We now describe how to compute the minimum number of agents involved in blocking
pairs in a maximum matching with type-signature v or else to report that no such maximum
matching exists. Our strategy is to encode the problem as an instance of INTEGER LINEAR
PROGRAMMING.
First we define the constraints. As usual, we need to ensure that every agent is involved
in exactly one pair (potentially involving a dummy agent), and as in the proof of Theorem 13
we need to enforce that the number of pairs that do not involve dummy agents is equal to the
maximum cardinality of any matching in our instance. Moreover, we need to make sure that
our matching does indeed have type-signature equal to v. This gives rise to the following linear
constraints.
∑
1≤i<j≤k
n{i,j} = Cmax∑
j∈[k+1]
n{i,j} = |Ni| ∀i ∈ [k]
n{i,j} > 0 ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ k + 1 with vi,j = 1
and n{i,j} = 0 ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ k + 1 with vi,j = 0.
Finally, we define our objective function, which captures the number of agents which are in-
volved in at least one blocking pair. By Lemma 14, we know that an agent of type i matched
with an agent of type j belongs to a blocking pair if and only if there exist i j′ i′ and j′ i j
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such that vi′,j′ = 1. Thus, for a given type-signature v, we can compute for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k+1
the indicator variable bi,j which takes the value 1 if an agent of type i matched with an agent of
type j in a matching with type-signature v will belong to a blocking pair, and takes the value
0 otherwise. It is now clear that the total number of agents that are involved in at least one
blocking pair in the matching is ∑
1≤i<j≤k+1
n{i,j}(bi,j + bj,i).
This is our linear objective function.
To generalise to the non-bipartite case takes just slightly more care: if two agents of type
i which are both matched to agents of type j form a blocking pair, then the total number of
blocking pairs that results is n{i,j}(n{i,j} − 1)/2 rather than n2{i,j}. Otherwise, exactly the same
method works. Thus we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 16. TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BP SRTI and TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BA SRTI
belong to FPT when parameterised by the total number of types.
It is also fairly straightforward to modify the IQP and ILP in the proofs of Theorem 13
and 15 to solve MIN BP SRTI and MIN BA SRTI respectively. We only need to remove the
constraint that enforces the matching to be of size Cmax.
Corollary 17. TYPED MIN BP SRTI and TYPED MIN BA SRTI belong to FPT when pa-
rameterised by the total number of types.
A related problem to MIN BP SR is EXACT BP SR which given an instance I of SR and
an integer Z, decides whether I admits a matching with exactly Z blocking pairs. Even this
problem is NP-hard [1] in general. If I is a typed instance, to solve EXACT BP SRTI we only
have to move the objective function in the IQP of Theorem 13 to the set of constraints, and
enforce it to be equal to Z.
Corollary 18. TYPED EXACT BP SRTI belongs to FPT when parameterised by the total
number of types.
4 Agents of the same type refine their preferences in the same
way
In this section, we generalise the model from Section 3 by allowing agents to refine their pref-
erences over candidates within a particular type, so long as agents of the same type still have
identical preference lists. Our key result is that refining preferences in this way can never
change the size of the largest stable matching, compared with the corresponding typed instance.
We also use the tools we develop to deal with this generalisation to show that MAX SRTI, and
hence also MAX SMTI and MAX HRT, become polynomially solvable if preferences over
types are strict, both in this setting and under the basic model. Lastly, we extend the results in
Section 3.4 to provide FPT algorithms for CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN
BP SMTI and CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BA SMTI.
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4.1 Definition of consistently-refined-typed instances
Consider a generalisation of typed instances in which agents are no longer necessarily indiffer-
ent between two agents of the same type, however agents of the same type occur consecutively
in preference lists. This means that for any two agents x and y of the same type i:
1. x and y have identical preference lists when restricted to N \ {x, y} ,
2. no agent of a different type appears between x and y in any preference list, and
3. if a tie in a preference list contains agents of two or more types, then that tie is in fact a
union of types.
The third criterion allows us to define in a consistent way what it means for agents of type
i to strictly prefer type j to type ` or to be indifferent between them. We will say that agents of
type i prefer type j to type ` if and only if given every pair of agents x of type j and y of type
` all agents in Ni prefer x to y. On the other hand, if type i is indifferent between types j and `
it means that, in the preference list for each agent x of type i, all agents in Nj ∪N` belong to a
single tie.
If an instance of a stable matching problem satisfies these slightly weaker requirements, we
say that the instance is consistently-refined-typed, and refer to the standard problems with input
of this form as CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SMTI etc.
A consistently-refined-typed instance I of SRTI is given as an input by specifying the num-
ber of types k and, for each type i, the set Ni of agents of type i as well as the preference order-
ing i over agents. Note that for typed instances i specified preferences over types, whereas
here the preferences are over agents. However, we can compute preferences over types from
preferences over agents in time O(kn). Note that if we are only given the preference list for
each agent as input (i.e., no information about types is given), it is straightforward to compute,
in polynomial time, the coarsest partition of the agents into types that satisfies the definition of
consistently-refined-typed instance.
We illustrate this definition with two short examples.
Example 2. Assume we have 4 types for the agents in a stable marriage setting, and that all
men are of type 1 and types 2, 3, and 4 correspond to women. Assume also that we have 3 men
m1, m2 and m3, and 7 women where w1 and w2 are of type 2, w3 and w4 are of type 3, and w5,
w6 and w7 are of type 4. Let all men have the preference ordering (w1 w2 w3 w4) w6 (w5 w7),
women of types 2 and 3 have the preference ordering (m1 m2 m3), and women of type 4
have the preference ordering m2 m1. This setting constitutes a consistently-refined-typed
instance. It is easy to compute the preferences of type 1 agents over the types of women,
which is (2 3) 4, similar to that of Example 1. Allowing men to have the preference order-
ing (w1 w2) w3 w4 (w5 w6 w7), while keeping everything else unchanged, also gives us a
consistently-refined-typed instance. In this new instance agents of type 1 have the strict prefer-
ence ordering 2 3 4 over the types of women.
Example 3. Assume that we are in a stable roommates setting with six agents a, b, . . . , f of
type 1. assume that the agents’ preference orderings are as follows:
a : (b c) (d e f) b : (a c) (d e f) c : (a b) (d e f)
d : (a b c) (e f) e : (a b c) (d f) f : (a b c) (d e)
This setting constitutes a consistently-refined-typed instance and it is easy to compute the re-
fined preferences within type 1 which is (a b c) (d e f).
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4.2 An FPT algorithm for CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI
To extend the result for TYPED MAX SRTI to CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI,
we need the following result.
Lemma 19. Let I be a consistently-refined-typed instance of SRTI and suppose that M is a
matching in I such that (1) there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2), i 6= j, where j i worstM(i) and
i j worstM(j), and (2) there is no pair (i, i), i ∈ [k], such that there is at least two agents
of type i and i i second worst(i). Then there is a stable matching M ′ such that, for every
(i, j) ∈ [k](2), both M and M ′ contain the same number of pairs that consist of one agent of
type i and another of type j. Moreover, given M , we can compute M ′ in time O(kn).
Proof. Let n{i,j}(M) denote the number of pairs in M consisting of an agent of type i and an
agent of type j. We construct a stable matching M ′ such that n{i,j}(M ′) = n{i,j}(M). Let⋃
i,j∈[k],i≤jM
′
i,j =M
′ be a decomposition of M ′ where M ′i,j is the projection of M
′ onto agent
types i and j. The polynomial-time construction of M ′ takes place in two steps.
Step 1: To start with, all agents are available. For each type i, take the candidate types
in type i’s decreasing order of preference with ties broken arbitrarily, 〈i1, i2, . . . iki〉, where is
denotes the type that is ranked s’th by type i. Starting with j = i1, if j 6= i, take the topmost
(from the perspective of an agent of type j) n{i,j}(M) available agents of type i, and put them in
Ai,j; these agents become unavailable from now on. If j = i then take the topmost 2 ·n{i,i}(M)
available agents of type i, and put them in Ai,i. Ai,j includes agents of type i that are to be
matched to agents of type j. Note that as the preference lists of agents of type j over agents
of type i may include ties, it may not be possible to determine exactly who are the topmost
available n{i,j}(M) agents in type i. To be more precise, when going down the preference
list of agents of type j over available agents of type i, we may reach a tie τ including z > 1
available agent where we need to pick x < z number of them. If this happens, arbitrarily pick
x agents from τ . This step can be done in time O(kn).
Step 2: We now show how to generate M ′i,j given Ai,j and Aj,i computed in Step 1. We do
so by computing a complete stable matching amongst the agents in Ai,j ∪ Aj,i. To do this, we
list the agents in Ai,j in non-increasing order of preference with respect to j, and similarly for
Aj,i, then pair up each agent with the agent having the same position on the other list. The total
time required to do this for all pairs (i, j) is O(n).
It follows immediately from this construction that, for each i and j, n{i,j}(M ′) = n{i,j}(M).
So it only remains to prove that M ′ is stable. Assume for a contradiction that M ′ admits a
blocking pair (a, b) where a , b, M ′(a) and M ′(b) are of types i, j, j′ and i′ respectively. Five
“kinds” of blocking pairs are possible, depending on how a and b compare each others’ types
against the types of their partners. We examine each of them and show that M ′ can admit none.
• Suppose that i 6= j, a prefers type j to type j′, and b prefers type i to type i′. In the
assumption of the lemma we have that in the given M there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2)
where j i worstM(i) and i j worstM(j). By construction of M ′, worstM(i) remains
unchanged under M ′ for all types i. It thus directly follows that M ′ cannot admit such a
blocking pair.
• Suppose that j 'i j′ (j 6= j′) or i 'j i′ (i 6= i′). We may assume that j 'i j′, j 6= j′;
a symmetric argument holds when i 'j i′, i 6= i′. Then, by our assumption that the
instance is consistently-refined-typed, any agent of type i, and hence a, is indifferent
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between all agents who are of type j or type j′. Therefore, M(a) 'a b and (a, b) cannot
be a blocking pair.
• Suppose that i = i′ and j = j′. The existence of such a blocking pair implies that M ′i,j
constructed in Step 2 is not stable with respect to the preferences of agents in Ai,j ∪Aj,i,
a contradiction.
• Suppose that either i = i′ or j = j′, but not both. Without loss of generality assume that
j = j′ and b prefers type i to type i′. Since a prefers b to M ′(a), and M ′(a) ∈ Aj,i, it
follows from the construction in Step 1 that, since b is not in Aj,i and is in Aj,i′ , any agent
of type j (including b) either prefers type i′ to type i or is indifferent between them, a
contradiction.
• Suppose that i = j so that a and b are of the same type. In the assumption of the lemma
we have that given M there is no pair (i, i) ∈ [k](2) where i i second worstM(i). By
the construction of M ′, second worstM(i) remains unchanged under M ′ for all types i.
It thus directly follows that M ′ cannot admit such a blocking pair.
Let I be a consistently-refined-typed instance of SRTI and let I ′ be a typed instance of SRTI
that is obtained from I by ignoring the refined preferences within each type (i.e. every agent is
indifferent between the candidates of the same type). It follows from the definition of stability
that every matching that is stable in I is also stable in I ′. Lemma 19 implies that for any stable
matching M in I ′, there exists a stable matching M ′ in I of the same cardinality as M . Thus,
in order to find a maximum cardinality matching in a consistently-refined-typed instance I of
SRTI, it suffices to (1) solve the typed problem (i.e. ignore the refined preferences within each
type) and then (2) use the algorithm provided in the proof of Lemma 19 to convert the solution
to a matching of the same cardinality that is stable in the instance I . Deriving a typed instance
from a consistently-refined-typed instance can be done easily in time O(kn). It thus follows
that CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI is in FPT parameterised by the number k
of different types in the instance.
Theorem 20. CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI can be solved in time kO(k2) log3 n+
O(kn).
We also have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 21. CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SMTI and CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-
TYPED MAX HRT are in FPT parameterised by the number k of different types in the instance.
4.3 Strict preferences over types
Elsewhere in the paper, we assume that agents can be indifferent between agents of two or more
types. We now show that MAX SRTI becomes easier if we restrict the set of possible instances
by assuming that agents have strict preferences over types. This argument is based on a private
communication with David Manlove.
Theorem 22. When preferences over types are strict, TYPED MAX SRTI and CONSISTENTLY-
REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI are polynomial-time solvable. Furthermore, all stable match-
ings (if any exists) are of the same size.
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Proof. Since TYPED MAX SRTI is a special case of CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX
SRTI, it suffices to demonstrate that the result holds for the latter problem. Let I be an in-
stance of CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI, and let I ′ be another instance of
CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI obtained from I by breaking any remaining
ties in the preference lists arbitrarily and consistently (so that agents of the same type still have
identical preference lists). Note that I ′ is in fact an instance of SRI. All stable matchings in an
instance of SRI (if it admits any) have the same cardinality [20] and so we can find a maximum
cardinality stable matching in I ′, or report that none exists, in polynomial time [20]. We will
argue that if I ′ admits no stable matching then neither does I , otherwise, a maximum cardinal-
ity stable matching M in I ′ is in fact a maximum cardinality stable matching in I . Therefore
CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SRTI is polynomial-time solvable.
Consider I0, the typed instance of SRTI obtained from I by ignoring preferences within
types (i.e. placing all agents of the same type in a single tie). Note that (as preferences over
types are strict in I) if we apply the same process to I ′, we also obtain the same typed instance
I0. By Lemma 19 we know that, given any stable matching M0 in I0, there is a stable matching
M ′ in I ′ of the same cardinality as M0. Therefore, if I ′ admits no stable matching neither does
I0. Furthermore, if I0 admits no stable matching then it follows from the definition of stability
that neither does I .
Now assume that I ′ admits a stable matching. It is clear that M must be stable in I , since
(as each agent’s preference list in I ′ is obtained from that in I by breaking ties) any blocking
pair with respect to M in the instance I would also be a blocking pair in I ′. It remains to argue
that there cannot be any stable matching of cardinality greater than |M | in I . Since all stable
matchings in I ′ have the same cardinality, we can conclude that (following Lemma 19) every
stable matching in I0 has the same cardinality as M . Moreover, as any matching that is stable
in I must also be stable in I0, it follows that all stable matchings in I have the same cardinality
as M . Thus M is a maximum cardinality stable matching in I , as required.
The above result, combined with Corollary 21, gives us the following result.
Corollary 23. When preferences over types are strict, (CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-)TYPED
MAX SMTI and (CONSISTENTLY-REFINED)-TYPED MAX HRT are polynomial-time solv-
able. Furthermore, all stable matchings are of the same size.
4.4 FPT algorithms for CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN
BP SMTI and CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN
BA SMTI
In this section we show how we can apply the ideas from the previous section to solve MAX
SIZE MIN BP/BA SMTI for consistently refined typed instances.
Corollary 24. CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BP SMTI and CONSISTENTLY-
REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BA SMTI belong to FPT when parameterised by the num-
ber of types.
Proof. We use the same strategy for both problems. First, we solve the problem for the cor-
responding typed instance (ignoring the more refined preferences within types). Note that the
number of blocking pairs or blocking agents achieved in this simplification of the problem
clearly gives a lower bound on the minimum number that can be achieved if we take into ac-
count all information; we will argue that in fact we can always obtain a matching which does
not increase either quantity when we take into account the full preference lists.
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To do this, we follow the method described in Lemma 19. Given the number of pairs n{i,j}
of type i and j for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, this method allows us to construct a matching M
where, for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k we have exactly n{i,j} pairs involving one agent of type i and
one of type j, and there is no blocking pair (x, y) such that x is currently matched to an agent
of the same type as y. Thus the only blocking pairs in M are those of the form (x, y) where x is
of type i and y of type j, and j i type(M(x)) and i j type(M(y)). But these are precisely
the blocking pairs that occur in the relaxation to a typed instance.
Thus we can indeed obtain a solution to MAX SIZE MIN BP SMTI or MAX SIZE MIN BA
SMTI by applying the appropriate algorithm to find the number of pairs of each type under
the relaxation to a typed instance, and then use the method of Lemma 19 to extend this to a
matching which does not introduce any additional blocking pairs when the full preference lists
are taken into consideration.
Combining this result with the techniques of Section 3.4, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 25. The following problems all belong to FPT when parameterised by the total
number of types:
• CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BP SRTI,
• CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MAX SIZE MIN BA SRTI,
• CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MIN BP SRTI,
• CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED MIN BA SRTI, and
• CONSISTENTLY-REFINED-TYPED EXACT BP SRTI.
5 Exceptions in preference lists
We have argued for the existence of typed instances, where k  n, based on the premise that
agents’ preferences are formed based on a small collection of candidates’ attributes. In practice,
it seems likely that an agent might have access to additional information about some small
subset of the candidates, either through personal acquaintance or some third-party connection;
we say that an agent considers such candidates to be exceptional. This additional information
may alter the agent’s opinion of candidates relative to that derived from the attributes alone,
and so affect where these candidates are placed in his/her preference ordering.
In this section we consider a generalisation of typed instances in which each agent may
find some small collection of other agents to be exceptional and ranks them without regard to
their types. Note that if only a small number of the agents in our instance consider one or more
candidates to be exceptional, we can capture this information in a typed instance: each agent
with exceptions in their preference list can be assigned their own type.
We say that an instance I of a stable matching problem is a (c,Any)-exception-typed in-
stance, for a given constant c, if I is a typed instance in which each agent finds at most c
number of the candidates exceptional and may rank them anywhere in his/her preference list.
Two special cases are (c,Top)-exception-typed and (c,Bottom)-exception-typed instances where
the exceptions are promoted to the top, or demoted to the bottom, of the preference lists, re-
spectively. We refer to the standard problems with input of this form as (C,ANY)-EXCEPTION
TYPED MAX SMTI etc.
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We show that if each agent finds at most one candidate exceptional, whom s/he promotes
to the top of his/her list, then MAX SMTI belongs to FPT. In contrast, if we allow for two (or
more) exceptions, and exceptional candidates can appear anywhere in the preference lists, then
MAX SMTI remains NP-hard even when there are only a constant number of types.
5.1 An FPT algorithm for (1,TOP)-EXCEPTION TYPED MAX SMTI
We consider a generalisation of typed instances in which (i) every agent considers at most one
other agent to be exceptional, and (ii) every agent would strictly prefer to be assigned to the
agent they consider to be exceptional than to any other agent. For each agent a let ex(a) denote
the exceptional candidate from a’s point of view; ex(a) = ∅ if a does not find any candidate
exceptional. Then, I is a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI if, given every two agents
x and y of the same type:
1. x and y have identical preference lists when restricted to N \ {ex(x), ex(y)}, and
2. all other agents who do not find either x or y exceptional are indifferent between x and
y.
Without loss of generality we can assume that there is no pair of agents who each consider
the other to be exceptional in a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI. If there are such
pairs, they must be assigned to each other in any stable matching; so we can remove all such
pairs to reduce to an instance that satisfies this assumption.
A (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI is given as input by, in addition to the spec-
ifications needed for a typed instance (see Section 3.1), providing for each agent his or her
exceptional candidate (if s/he has one).
Let I be a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI, and let M be a matching in I . As in
Section 3.2, we may assume without loss of generality that every agent is matched, by creating
sufficiently many dummy agents of type k + 1 which are inserted at the end of each man’s and
woman’s (possibly incomplete) preference list. In order to obtain an analogue of the stability
criterion given in Lemma 3 in this setting, we need some more notation.
Recall that we write j 'i ` if agents of type i are indifferent between types j and `. It is
straightforward to see that 'i defines an equivalence relation on [k] for each i. Given j ∈ [k],
we write classi(j) for the equivalence class under 'i which contains j. For each equivalence
class J under 'i, we say that the agent x of type i has subtype i[J ] if:
1. some agent y, with type(y) ∈ J , considers x exceptional, and
2. there is no agent z, such that type(z) i j for j ∈ J , who considers x exceptional.
Thus subtype(x) = i[J ] if the most desirable agents who consider x exceptional have types
from J . If an agent x of type i is not considered exceptional by any agent, we say that x has
subtype i[{k + 1}]. We also introduce a second dummy type 0, which is inserted at the head
of each type’s preference list and corresponds to exceptional candidates. We write Ni[J ] for the
set of agents of subtype i[J ].
Observe that the sets Ni[J ] can be computed in time O(n): for each agent x, subtype(x)
can be computed in time O(n) with suitable data structures.
We will need a variation on the function worstM , which we call worstexM . For any non-
empty set Ni[J ], worstexM(i[J ]) is the type of the least desirable partner received by an agent
of subtype i[J ] who is not matched with an agent they find exceptional; if the least desirable
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partners assigned to agents of subtype i[J ] belong to two or more different types between which
agents of type i are indifferent, we define worstexM(i[J ]) to be the lexicographically first such
type. If every agent of subtype i[J ] is matched with a partner they find exceptional, we set
worstexM(i[J ]) = 0. Therefore worstM(i), as defined in Section 3.3, is the least desirable type
out of {worstexM(i[J ]) : Ni[J ] 6= ∅}.
We say that a matching M in an instance I of (1,Top)-exception-typed SMTI realises the
functionworstex, mapping nonempty subtypes i[J ] to values in {0, 1, . . . , k+1}, ifworstexM(i[J ]) i
worstex(i[J ]) whenever Ni[J ] 6= ∅. We can now characterise stability in a (1,Top)-exception-
typed instance.
Lemma 26. Let I be a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI. Then a matching M in I is
stable if and only if there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2) such that
1. j i worstM(i) and i j worstM(j), or
2. i j worstexM(j[classj(i)]).
Proof. Suppose first that M is not stable. In this case there is a blocking pair (x, y) where x is
of type i and y is of type j. We show that at least one of the two aforementioned conditions must
hold. If neither x nor y finds the other exceptional, then it must be that they prefer each other’s
type to the type of their assigned partner. This implies that j i type(M(x)) i worstM(i)
and i j type(M(y)) j worstM(j) so condition (1) holds. If one of x and y finds the other
exceptional, we may assume without loss of generality that x finds y exceptional. We may
further assume, without loss of generality, that x is the (equally) most desirable agent (from the
point of view of y) who prefers y to his/her current partner. This means there is no agent of type
`, with ` j type(x) = i, who considers y to be exceptional, implying that y ∈ Nj[classj(i)].
Hence, by the definition of a blocking pair, we see that i = type(x) j type(M(y)) j
worstexM(j[classj(i)]), and condition (2) holds.
Conversely, it is straightforward to see that if we have any pair (i, j) satisfying condition
(1) or (2) then there will be a blocking pair and hence M will not be stable. If condition (1)
holds, then worstM(i) and worstM(j) must both be greater than 0, and the condition implies
that there is a pair (x, y) of type (i, j) who prefer each other to their partners. If condition (2)
holds, then there exists an agent y ∈ Nj[classj(i)] who is considered exceptional by some agent
x whose type is in classj(i), and y prefers any agent whose type belongs to classj(i) to his/her
current partner, so (x, y) forms a blocking pair.
We will say that a function worstex is I-exception-stable for a (1,Top)-exception-typed
instance I of SMTI if there is no pair (i, j) ∈ [k](2) such that either j i worst(i) and
i j worst(j) or i j worstex(j[classj(i)]). Observe that Lemma 26 gives us the following
straightforward corollary.
Corollary 27. Let I be a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI. Suppose thatM is a match-
ing in I which realises the I-exception-stable function worstex, and that M contains a pair
(x, y) where x considers y to be exceptional and y is of subtype i[J ]. Then type(x) ∈ J and
worstex(i[J ]) ∈ J .
Proof. Since subtype(y) = i[J ], there exists j ∈ J such that some agent z of type j considers
y to be exceptional. By definition of subtype, the fact that x considers y to be exceptional
means that j i type(x). Thus, as M realises worstex, we see that
j i type(x) = type(M(y)) i worstex(i[J ]).
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If any of the preferences in this equation is in fact strict, we would violate condition (2) of
Lemma 26, contradicting our assumption that worstex is I-exception stable. Therefore we
must have j 'i type(x) 'i worstex(i[J ]), implying that both type(x) and worstex(i[J ]) are in
classi(j) = J , as required.
Given any I-exception-stable function worstex, we write max(worstex) for the maximum
cardinality of any matching in I that realises worstex. We have an analogous result to Corollary
4 in this setting.
Lemma 28. Let I be a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI. Then the cardinality of the
largest stable matching in I is equal to
max{max(worstex) : worstex is I-exception-stable}.
We now argue that we can compute max(worstex) for any I-exception-stable function
worstex in polynomial time.
Lemma 29. Let I be a (1,Top)-exception-typed instance of SMTI, and fix an I-exception-
stable function worstex. We can compute max(worstex), and generate a stable matching of
size max(worstex), in time O(n5/2 log n).
Proof sketch. Using a binary search strategy, we can determine the maximum size of a match-
ing realising worstex by solving O(log n) instances of the decision problem “Is max(worstex)
at least c?”, where c ∈ {1, . . . , bn/2c}. We show that to determine whether max(worstex) ≥ c
it is enough to decide whether an undirected graph G = (V,E) withO(n) vertices, constructed
from I in timeO(n2), admits a perfect matching. Moreover, if G admits a perfect matching E ′,
E ′ corresponds to a stable matching in I of size at least c. The graph G = (V,E) is constructed
as follows. Suppose that there are in total n agents. The vertex-set V contains one vertex cor-
responding to each agent in I , together with n− 2c dummy vertices. The edge-set E contains
an edge between the agents x, of type a[C], and y, of type b[D], if and only if x and y find each
other mutually acceptable and either
1. neither x nor y considers the other to be exceptional, b a worstex(a[C]), and a b
worstex(b[D]), or
2. a ∈ D, x considers y to be exceptional, and worstex(b[D]) ∈ D, or
3. b ∈ C, y considers x to be exceptional, and worstex(a[C]) ∈ C.
We additionally have an edge between each pair of dummy vertices, and between each dummy
vertex and every agent x such that worstex(i[J ]) = k + 1 where i[J ] = subtype(x); that is,
if worstex allows for x to be unmatched. Deciding whether G admits a perfect matching can
be done in time O(√|V ||E|), which coupled with the fact that |V | = O(n) gives us O(n5/2).
Therefore, we conclude that we can compute max(worstex), and generate a stable matching of
size max(worstex), in time O(n5/2 log n).
Corollary 30. (1,TOP)-EXCEPTION TYPED MAX SMTI can be solved in timeO
(
kk
2
(k3 + n5/2 log n)
)
.
Proof. Suppose that I is the input to our instance of (1,TOP)-EXCEPTION TYPED MAX SMTI.
We consider each possible function worstex : [k] × [k] → {0, 1, . . . , k + 1} in turn; there are
at most (k + 2)k2 such functions. We can determine in time O(k3) whether worstex is I-
exception-stable. For each I-exception-stable function worstex, we compute max(worstex) in
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time O(n5/2 log n) by Lemma 29. We then take the maximum value of max(worstex) over
all I-exception-stable functions worstex which, by Lemma 28, is equal to the cardinality of the
largest stable matching in I . The proof of Lemma 29 is constructive, that is, it also generates
a stable matching of size max(worstex).
5.2 (2,ANY)-EXCEPTION TYPED MAX SMTI is NP-hard for a constant
number of types
In this section we investigate the effects of allowing each agent to consider more than one
candidate to be exceptional. We show that, if we allow each agent to declare two candidates
exceptional, and these two candidates can appear anywhere in the agent’s preference list, then
MAX SMTI is NP-hard even under severe restrictions. In fact, we show that the special case
COM SMTI, which involves deciding whether a given instance of SMTI admits a complete
stable matching (i.e., a matching that matches all agents), is NP-complete even if the number
of types is bounded by a constant. Our proof is by reduction from the NP-complete problem
CLIQUE, defined as follows: given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and r ∈ N, does G contain
a clique on at least r vertices?
Theorem 31. (2,ANY)-EXCEPTION TYPED COM SMTI is NP-complete, even if only men
have exceptions in their preference lists, preferences over types are strict, and there are three
types each of men and women.
Proof. The problem obviously is in NP as we can easily check in quadratic time whether a
given matching is complete and stable. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from CLIQUE. Let
(G = (V,E), r) be the input to an instance of CLIQUE, and suppose that V = {v1, . . . , vn}
andE = {e1, . . . , em}. We will construct an instance I of (2-ANY)-EXCEPTION TYPED MAX
SMTI so thatG contains a clique on r vertices if and only if there is a complete stable matching
in I .
Our instance I has six types in total; types 1, 2 and 3 are types of men and types 4, 5 and
6 are types of women. Type 1 contains one man corresponding to each edge in E; abusing
notation, we shall write ei for the man corresponding to the edge ei. Type 4 contains one
woman corresponding to each vertex in V , and again we abuse notation to write vi for the
woman corresponding to the vertex vi. Types 2 and 3 consist of r and n− r men respectively,
and types 5 and 6 consist of
(
r
2
)
and m− (r
2
)
women respectively.1 The preferences over types
for each type is as follows:
Type 1: 6 5 4 Type 4: 2 1 3
Type 2: 4 Type 5: 1
Type 3: 4 Type 6: 1
We now describe the exceptions. Only men of type 1 have any exceptions in their preference
lists. Each man ei of type 1 considers two women of type 4 to be exceptional, and he ranks
these two women in a tie between types 6 and 5. If ei = (vj, v`) then ei considers vj and v`
exceptional. This completes the definition of I . Clearly I can be constructed from (G, r) in
polynomial time.
We claim that G contains a clique on r vertices if and only if I admits a complete stable
matching.
1If there is a clique on r vertices then there must be at least
(
r
2
)
number of edges, hence m− (r2) ≥ 0.
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(⇐): We argue that if (G, r) is a yes-instance, then I admits a complete stable matching.
Let U ⊂ V be a set of r vertices in G which induces a clique. We construct matching M in I as
follows. Each woman in U (who are all of type 4) is matched to a man of type 2. Let F denote
the set of
(
r
2
)
edges with both endpoints in U . Each man in F (who is of type 1) is matched
to a woman of type 5. The remaining women of type 4 are matched to men of type 3, and the
remaining men of type 1 are matched to women of type 6. M clearly matches all agents. Note
that the matched pairs are all of the following four pairs of types: (1,5), (1,6), (2,4), and (3,4).
It remains to show that M is stable.
Note that no agent of type 2, 3, 5 or 6 can be involved in a blocking pair: all these agents
are matched in M , and are indifferent between all candidates they find acceptable. Hence any
blocking pair is between a man of type 1 and a woman of type 4. Moreover, no blocking pair
can involve a man m of type 1 who is matched with a woman of type 6, or a woman w of type 4
who is matched with a man of type 2: such agents (m or w) are already matched with their first
(equal) choice of partner. Therefore, if there is a blocking pair, it is of the form (e, v) where
e is a man of type 1, v is a woman of type 4, M(e) is of type 5 and M(v) is of type 3. By
construction of M , as M(e) is of type 5, we know that e ∈ F . Thus, the two women that e
finds exceptional both belong to U and so are matched to men of type 2. It follows that e does
not find v exceptional. Thus e does not prefer v (of type 4) to his current partner of type 5, and
so (v, e) cannot form a blocking pair. We can therefore conclude that M is indeed stable.
(⇒): Conversely, we show that if there is a complete stable matching M in I , then (G, r)
is a yes-instance. Since M matches every agent, all men of types 2 and 3 must be matched to
women of type 4 (i.e. women corresponding to vertices), and all women of types 5 and 6 must
be matched to men of type 1 (i.e. men corresponding to edge). The numbers of agents in each
type mean that in a complete matching no man corresponding to an edge can be matched to a
woman corresponding to a vertex. Let W be the set of r women who are matched to men of
type 2. We will argue that W must induce a clique in G.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that W does not induce a clique. This means that there are
at most
(
r
2
) − 1 edges of G with both endpoints in W . In particular, there is woman of type
5 who is matched to a man of type 1, corresponding to some edge e whose endpoints are not
both in W . Suppose, without loss of generality, that v is an endpoint of e that is not in U . Since
v /∈ W , we know that M(v) is of type 3. This means that v strictly prefers e (of type 1) to
her current partner. Moreover, since v is an endpoint of e, she is considered exceptional by e
and so e prefers v to any woman of type 5, including M(e). Thus, (v, e) is a blocking pair,
contradicting the assumption that M is a stable matching. We therefore conclude that W must
induce a clique and so (G, r) is a yes-instance.
The next result then follows immediately.
Corollary 32. (2,ANY)-EXCEPTION TYPED MAX SMTI is NP-hard, even if only men have
exceptions in their preference lists, preferences over types are strict, and there are three types
each of men and women.
6 Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples
The job market for medical residents underwent a change since mid 1970’s, due to married
couples seeking posts in nearby hospitals. Subsequently, the central matching systems had
to be adapted to take into account couple’s preferences, as otherwise couples would seek to
arrange their own matches outside the centralized clearinghouse. The Hospitals/Residents
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problem with Couples (HRC) models such settings, where couples can send in preferences over
pairs of hospitals. The size of a given matching in an instance of HRC is equal to the number
of residents matched in the matching.
Definition 1. STABLE HRC is the problem of deciding whether an instance of HRC admits a
stable matching.
Definition 2. MAX HRC is the problem of identifying a maximum cardinality stable matching
in an HRC instance, or reporting that none exists.
STABLE HRC is NP-complete, and as a corollary so is MAX HRC. The result holds even if
each hospital has capacity 1 and there are no single residents [37]. The parameterized complex-
ity of STABLE HRC has been studied in [32, 4], where [32] also studies MAX HRC. STABLE
HRC is W[1]-hard when the problem is parametrized by the number of couples [32]. The re-
sult holds even if each hospital has capacity 1. However, STABLE HRC belongs to FPT when
the problem is parametrized by the number of couples in the instance and the hospitals’ list are
derived from a strictly-ordered master list of residents [4].
In the remainder of this section, we first provide a stability definition for instances of HRC,
then extend our TYPED and REFINED-TYPED models to such instances, and conclude with
presenting an FPT algorithm for TYPED MAX HRC.
6.1 Stability in HRC
In an instance of HRC, the set of residentsR includes an even size subsetR′ consisting of those
residents who belong to couples, where every resident in R′ belongs to exactly one couple. Let
C denote the set of ordered pairs (ri, rj) where ri and rj form a couple. Single residents and
hospitals find a subsets of candidates acceptable and rank them in strict order of preference.
Every couple (ri, rj) ∈ C has a joint strict preference ordering over an acceptable subset of
ordered hospital pairs.
Different stability definitions for an instance of HRC have been provided in the literature,
most of them distinct from one another (see, e.g., [4, 26, 32, 33, 7, 13, 25, 38]). In this paper
we adopt the definition of [33] and provide it as it has been given in [29]. We say that a hospital
hj is undersubscribed if |M(hj)| < q(hj) . Given an instance of HRC, a matching M is stable
if it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair satisfies one of the following properties:
1. it involves a single resident ri and a hospital hj where (a) ri prefers hj to M(ri) and (b)
hj is undersubscribed or prefers ri to its worst assigned resident in M ;
2. it involves a couple (ri, rj) ∈ C and a hospital hk such that either
(a) (rj, rj) prefers (hk,M(rj)) to (M(rj),M(rk)), and hk is undersubscribed or prefers
ri to a resident in M(hk) \ {rj}; or
(b) (rj, rj) prefers (M(ri), hk) to (M(rj),M(rk)), and hk is undersubscribed or prefers
rj to a resident in M(hk) \ {ri};
3. it involves a couple (ri, rj) ∈ C and a pair of (not necessarily distinct) hospitals hk, h`
such that hk 6= M(ri), h` 6= M(rj), (rj, rj) prefers (hk, h`) to (M(rj),M(rk)), and
either
(a) hk 6= h`, and hk (respectively h`) is either undersubscribed or prefers ri (respectively
rj) to at least one of its assigned residents; or
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(b) hk = h` and q(hk)− |M(hk)| ≥ 2; or
(c) hk = h` and q(hk) − |M(hk)| ≥ 1 and hk prefers at least one of ri, rj to one of its
assigned residents; or
(d) hk = h`, q(hk) = |M(hk)|, hk prefers ri to some resident rs ∈ M(hk), and prefers
rj to some resident in M(hk) distinct from rs.
6.2 TYPED Instances
In an instance of HRC, each type i that is associated with a single resident or a hospital has a
preference ordering over types of the candidates, similarly to that defined earlier for instances
of HRT. We assume, without loss of generality, that each pair of residents that form a couple
are ordered such that the type of the first one is no larger than the type of the second one. That
is, for each (x, y) ∈ C where x is of type i and y is of type j, it is the case that i ≤ j. Each
pair of types (i, j) (with i ≤ j) associated with a couple has a joint preference ordering over
ordered pairs of “hospital” types.
The same conditions outlined in Section 3 apply to single residents and hospitals. That is,
(1) every two single residents or hospitals of the same type have identical preference lists, and
(2) all single residents are indifferent between hospitals of the same type, and all hospitals are
indifferent between residents of the same type.
These notions extend naturally to the preference lists of couples:
1. if (x, y) and (x′, y′) are couples of the same type (i, j) then (x, y) and (x′, y′) have iden-
tical preference lists, and
2. all couples are indifferent between (hs, ht) and (hk, h`) if hs and hk are hospitals of the
same type, say i, and ht and h` are hospitals of the same type, say j.
6.3 An FPT algorithm for TYPED MAX HRC
We adapt the method used to prove Theorem 6 in order to show that TYPED MAX HRC is in
FPTwhen parameterised by the number of different types in the instance. The idea, once again,
is to (1) consider a number of possibilities for the matching, where this number of possibilities
is bounded by a function of k, (2) determine for each such possibility whether a matching which
meets the conditions will be stable, and then (3) express the maximisation problem associated
with each set of stable conditions as an instance of INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING.
As in previous sections, we assume without loss of generality that there is at least one agent
of each type; however we cannot be sure that there will always be a single resident of a given
type, or a couple of a specific pair of types. Also, as in previous sections, we assume that
every agent is matched by creating sufficiently many dummy agents of type k + 1 which are
inserted at the end of each single resident’s and hospital’s (possibly incomplete) preference list;
we insert (k + 1, k + 1) at the end of each couple’s preference list.
We start by providing conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a matching to be
stable in a given typed instance of HRC. Given a matchingM (in which every agent is matched,
perhaps to a dummy agent), we define three functions worstM , second worstM and assignedM .
The function worstM is defined as follows:
• for any resident type i of which there is at least one single agent, worstM(i) is the type of
the least desirable hospital (with respect to the preference list for i) to which any single
resident of type i is assigned in M ;
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• for any pair of resident types i and j (with i ≤ j) such that at least one couple has type
(i, j), worstM(i, j) is the least desirable pair of hospital types (with respect to the joint
preference list for (i, j)) to which any couple of types i and j are assigned in M ;
• for any hospital type p, worstM(p) is the type of the least desirable resident (with respect
to the preference list for p) assigned to a hospital of type p in M .
The function second worstM is only defined for hospital types where the total capacity of
hospitals of the type is at least two: second worstM(p) is the type of the second least desirable
resident assigned to any hospital of type p inM . The boolean function assignedM is defined for
each combination of a pair of resident types and a pair of hospital types: assignedM((i, j), (`, p)) =
1 if and only if there is at least one couple involving residents of type i and j who are assigned
to hospitals of types ` and p respectively.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that types 1 to k′ are types of residents, and
types k′+1 to k are types of hospitals. Let (k′ : k] denote the set {k′+1, . . . k}. Let |Ni| (with
i ∈ [k′]) denote the number of single residents of type i, |Np| (with p ∈ (k′ : k]) denote the total
capacity of hospitals of type p, and |Ni,j| (with i, j ∈ [k′] where i ≤ j) the number of couples
where the first resident is of type i and the second one is of type j.
It is straightforward to prove the following lemma using a similar approach as in the proof
of 3 and the definition of a stable matching for an instance of HRC.
Lemma 33. Let I be a typed instance of HRC. Then a matching M is stable if and only if none
of the following holds:
1. There is a pair of types (i, p), i ∈ [k′], p ∈ (k′ : k] such that |Ni| > 0, p i worstM(i)
and i p worstM(p) .
2. There is a couple-type (i, j) with |Ni,j| > 0 and a hospital type ` such that either
(a) i ` worstM(`) and there is a pair of hospital types (p, q) such that assignedM((i, j), (p, q)) =
1 and (`, q) i,j (p, q), or
(b) j ` worstM(`) and there is a pair of hospital types (p, q) such that assignedM((i, j), (p, q)) =
1 and (p, `) i,j (p, q).
3. There is a couple-type (i, j) with |Ni,j| > 0 and two hospital types ` and p (where ` 6= p)
such that (i) (`, p) i,j worstM(i, j), (ii) i ` worstM(`), and (iii) j p worstM(p);
4. There is a couple-type (i, j) with |Ni,j| > 0 and a hospital type ` such that (i) (`, `) i,j
worstM(i, j), (ii) i, j ` worstM(`), and either
(a) i ` second worst(`), or
(b) j ` second worst(`).
Theorem 34. TYPED MAX HRC is in FPT when parameterised by the number k of different
types in the instance.
Proof. Lemma 33 gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a matching realising the func-
tions worst, second worst and assigned to be stable. We consider each of the feasible possibil-
ities for the functions worst, second worst and assigned in turn and determine, using Lemma
33, whether a matching realising them will be stable; this can be done for any set of candidate
functions in time O(k3).
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For any trio of feasible functions worst, second worst and assigned that give rise to a stable
matching (if any), we need to determine the maximum number of residents that can be matched
in any matching that realises the trio, and we do this (as in the rest of the paper) by solving an
instance of INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING.
We define variables ni,p and n(i,j),(p,q) as follows. For each pair of types (i, p), i ∈ [k′], p ∈
(k′ : k], we have a variable ni,p which denotes the number of single residents of type i matched
to hospitals of type p. Additionally, for each combination of a pair of resident types (i, j) (with
i ≤ j) and a pair of hospital types (p, q) (where p and q may or may not be distinct), we have a
variable n(i,j),(p,q) which denotes the number of couples consisting of residents of types i and j
respectively such that the resident of type i is assigned to a hospital of type p and the resident of
type j is assigned to a hospital of type q. Our objective is to maximise the size of the matching
hence to maximise: ∑
i≤k′,k′<p≤k
ni,p +
∑
i,j≤k′,k′<p,q≤k
2 · n(i,j),(p,q)
Our first set of constraints ensures that every agent is involved in exactly one pair. The first
constraint handles single agents, the second one the hospitals, and the last one couples.∑
k′<p≤k
ni,p = |Ni|, ∀i ∈ [k′]∑
i≤k′
ni,p +
∑
i,j≤k′,k′<q≤k
(n(i,j),(p,q) + n(i,j),(q,p)) = |Np|, ∀p ∈ (k′ : k]∑
k′<p,q≤k
n(i,j),(p,q) = |Ni,j|, ∀i, j : i ≤ j ≤ k′
The next set of constraints ensures that function worst complies with its definition.∑
piworst(i)
ni,p = |Ni|, ∀i ∈ [k′] : |Ni| > 0
ni,worst(i) > 0, ∀i ∈ [k′] : |Ni| > 0∑
ipworst(p)
ni,p +
∑
i,jpworst(p)
k′<q≤k
(n(i,j),(p,q) + n(i,j),(q,p)) = |Np|, ∀p ∈ (k′ : k]
nworst(p),p > 0, ∀p ∈ (k′ : k]∑
(p,q)(i,j)worst(i,j)
n(i,j),(p,q) = |Ni,j|, ∀i, j : i ≤ j ≤ k′ : |Ni,j| > 0
n(i,j),worst(i,j) > 0, ∀i, j : i ≤ j ≤ k′ : |Ni,j| > 0
The following set of constraints ensures that function second worst for the hospitals com-
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plies with its definition.∑
second worst(p)pipworst(p)
ni,p = 0, ∀p ∈ (k′ : k] : |Np| > 1
nworst(p),p + nsecond worst(p),p > 1, ∀p ∈ (k′ : k] : |Np| > 1
nworst(p),p > 1 ∀p ∈ (k′ : k] : |Np| > 1 and second worst(p) = worst(p)
And finally, the last set of constraints ensure that boolean variables assigned are set cor-
rectly.
n(i,j),(p,q) > 0, ∀i, j ∈ [k′]∀p, q ∈ (k′, k] such that assigned((i, j)(p, q)) = 1
The above integer linear program has O(k4) variables and O(k2) constraints. The upper
bound on the absolute value a variable can take is n. Therefore, by Theorem 1, this maximi-
sation problem for any trio of candidate functions worst, second worst and assigned can be
solved in time 2O(k2) log3 n.
7 Summary and Future Work
We studied settings in which agents are partitioned into k different types, and the type of an
agent determines his or her preferences, as well as how s/he is compared against other agents.
We considered a basic setting and two generalisations. In the basic model, referred to as typed,
agents have preferences over types and agents of the same types have identical preferences.
In the first generalisation, referred to as consistently-refined-typed, agents’ preferences may be
refined by more detailed preferences within a single type, subject to the requirement that agents
of the same type still have identical preference lists. In the second generalisation, referred to as
exception-typed, each agent may regard some small collection of other agents to be exceptional
and rank them without regard to their types.
If k is considered to be part of the input, then our models do not place any restrictions on
preference lists; we can create a type for each agent and hence let k = n. Thus we can deduce
that MAX SMTI, MAX HRT, MAX SRT, MAX SIZE MIN BP/BA SMI, MAX SIZE MIN
BP/BA SRI, and MIN BP SR are all NP-complete, in either of our three settings, when k is
part of the input.
We are interested in, and have argued for the existence of, scenarios where k is not part of
the input and is much smaller than n. Under both typed and consistently-refined-typed settings,
we showed that MAX SMTI, MAX HRT, MAX SRTI, MAX SIZE MIN BP/BA SMTI, MAX
SIZE MIN BP/BA SRTI, and MIN BP SRTI belong to the parameterised complexity class
FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents, and so admit efficient
algorithms when this number of types is small. We were further able to prove that MAX SMTI,
MAX HRT and MAX SRTI are polynomial-time solvable when agents have strict preferences
over types. Additionally, we were able to show that, under the typed setting, MAX HRC is in
FPT parameterised by the number of different types of agents.
Under the exception-typed setting, we showed that if each agent finds one candidate ex-
ceptional and promotes that candidate to the top of his/her preference list, then MAX SMTI
belongs to FPT parameterised by k. In contrast, if we allow for each agent to find two or more
candidates exceptional who can appear anywhere in the preference lists, then MAX SMTI re-
mains NP-hard, even when the number of types is bounded by a constant.
32
It would be interesting to investigate what further generalisations of our model yield FPT al-
gorithms forNP-hard stable matching problems. In particular, the complexity of (1,BOTTOM)-
EXCEPTION-TYPED MAX SMTI, (1,ANY)-EXCEPTION-TYPED MAX SMTI, and (2,TOP)-
EXCEPTION-TYPED MAX SMTI remain open, as well as the complexity of MAX SRTI,
MAX SIZE MIN BP/BA SMTI, MAX SIZE MIN BP/BA SRTI, and MIN BP SRTI under
the exception-typed setting. Moreover, we could consider further restrictions with two or more
exceptions, for example if an exceptional candidate can only be moved to the top or bottom of
its type.
Another intriguing question would be to understand how the complexity of MAX SMTI
and MAX SIZE MIN BP/BA SMTI changes when agents on only one side of the market are
associated with types.
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